Chapter 1: Introduction to Scientific Metaphysics

It has been a while since our previous book club, and I believe it’s time to initiate another discussion! I would like to invite you to explore Scientific Metaphysics, a volume edited by my esteemed colleagues Don Ross, James Ladyman, and Harold Kincaid, published by Oxford University Press. The book's description states:

"Scientific Metaphysics compiles original essays from leading philosophers of science regarding the question of whether metaphysics can and should be integrated with natural science. Some may view the concept of naturalized metaphysics as contradictory, believing that metaphysics inherently deals with matters beyond empirical inquiry. However, many authors in this volume argue that for metaphysics to uncover objective truths, it must align with and be inspired by scientific methodologies. Ultimately, this raises the question of whether metaphysics should yield to science and vanish from contemporary discourse or persist as a discipline that unifies the specific sciences into a cohesive naturalistic framework."

At the outset, I must acknowledge two points. First, I am generally supportive of the aims proposed by Ross and his colleagues, though I do not completely agree with all aspects. I have previously contended that metaphysics as "first philosophy," characterized by an armchair approach to discovering new knowledge about the universe, is outdated. This method was employed by the Presocratics, Aristotle, and many others up until Descartes, prior to the rise of modern science. Despite its decline, first philosophy continues to resurface, thanks to figures like David Chalmers and Philip Goff.

Second, I am somewhat disheartened that the book falls short in certain areas, representing a missed opportunity. Many contributors merely react to one another or to authors not included in the collection, rather than outlining a positive vision for the field. Nevertheless, the ten chapters in Scientific Metaphysics provide substantial material for thought, and I will strive to highlight key points that can foster a productive discussion.

The initial chapter, penned by co-editor Harold Kincaid, aims to establish the foundation for the rest of the book by addressing a crucial question: what might a scientific metaphysics entail, and how does it differ from traditional metaphysics? Kincaid asserts, "One overarching theme [of the volume] is that traditional metaphysics, particularly in its current form as analytic metaphysics, is a questionable pursuit due to its lack of scientific grounding. The thesis posits that any legitimate metaphysics and conceptual analysis must be connected to the findings and practices of science."

A lot depends on how Ross and his colleagues will elaborate on this description. The risk lies in wanting to entirely replace metaphysics with science, a rather scientistic approach that, in my opinion (though I know Don and James have differing views), lacks adequate justification. If, however, we assert that any contemporary form of metaphysics must remain aligned with scientific discoveries and take scientific results seriously, then I am fully in agreement.

One way to interpret Kincaid's position, and certainly the way I would articulate the concept of scientific metaphysics, is that our claims should never diverge too far from the evidence supporting them. This is why I find Chalmers's reliance on "conceivability" and the broader use of "intuition" in analytic metaphysics to be problematic.

Regarding conceivability, it serves as a weak basis for constructing any argument. It is too easy to imagine scenarios that are not only physically but also logically impossible. Take, for example, the idea of squaring the circle, a challenge that captivated ancient geometers. The task involves creating a square with the same area as a given circle using a finite number of steps. Many attempted this for centuries, believing it might be achievable. However, in 1882, it was conclusively shown to be impossible. Conceivability led numerous geometers down a fruitless path, expending considerable time and resources. Thus, when Chalmers claims he can conceive of a philosophical zombie—an entity that appears and acts like us yet lacks internal mental states—I dismiss it as yet another attempt at squaring the circle. Based on our current understanding, such a zombie is physically impossible and merits no serious consideration. Moreover, it fails to substantiate Chalmers's repeated assertions that physicalism in philosophy is incorrect.

Intuition presents a different challenge. Experts in any field, such as chess, derive intuitions from subconscious processing of information. It is well-known that the intuitions of seasoned experts are far more reliable than those of beginners. This makes sense, as an expert is someone who has become intimately familiar with a specific body of knowledge. However, in science and any empirically driven endeavor (including chess), one does not rely solely on intuition. Instead, one tests these intuitions against actual data from the real world. The issue with analytic metaphysics is that this critical step is often neglected, leading to a situation philosopher Dan Dennett refers to as "schmess": a game akin to chess but governed by slightly different rules. While it may require equal ingenuity to play schmess as it does to play chess, no one cares about your schmess games because they are interested in chess. Analytic metaphysics is to scientific metaphysics what schmess is to chess.

Kincaid continues: "The term 'scientific philosophy' is derived from [philosopher of science Hans] Reichenbach. For him, scientific philosophy involved employing scientific methods and results to address issues arising from science that are fundamentally philosophical. This certainly describes the mindset and practices behind most chapters in this volume. Scientific philosophy embodies a form of naturalism."

I would not go so far as to equate philosophy with science. I still view philosophy as a distinct field that is, nevertheless, connected to science, similar to the relationship between logic and mathematics and science. In essence, I resist the inclination, which occasionally surfaces in Ross et al.'s work, to categorize metaphysics or philosophy in general as a branch of science. If anything, the reverse is true, as science has historically emerged from philosophical inquiry.

However, Kincaid's point about naturalism is well taken and applies not only to philosophy but also to mathematics and logic. This is perhaps best illustrated through examples from math or logic. Some mathematicians and logicians believe their fields to be independent of empirical reality, asserting that mathematical and logical truths are universal and mind-independent. This perspective was notably adopted by Plato, who, impressed by the advancements of geometers, allegedly inscribed at the entrance of his Academy: "Let no one ignorant of geometry enter."

In reality, logic, mathematics, and philosophy are constructs of the human mind rather than insights into a realm of universal Ideas. Although much modern logic and mathematics are conducted independently of empirical evidence, both originated as practical, empirically based pursuits. Take, for instance, the three fundamental laws of logic: the law of identity, the law of non-contradiction, and the law of excluded middle. Where do you suppose Aristotle derived these concepts, if not from observing that they appear to hold true at the scale of reality he had access to? Or consider Euclidean geometry. Is it true? That question lacks meaning. Euclidean geometry is a series of consequences derived from a limited set of initial axioms. Alter the axioms, and you will obtain different results. Thus, it becomes a matter of pragmatism regarding the usefulness of a particular type of logic, mathematics, or geometry.

This exemplifies what it means to "naturalize" these disciplines. The same applies to philosophy, which can be accurately described as a blend of formal and informal logic applied to issues significant to humanity, such as the nature of truth (epistemology), beauty (aesthetics), morality (ethics), and, of course, reality (metaphysics). None of these philosophical domains have been absorbed into science, yet all must remain attentive to scientific developments relevant to their inquiries or risk devolving into mere examples of schmess.

I believe Kincaid articulates the essence of the matter when he states: "Common to nearly all of [the chapters in this book] are 1) profound skepticism regarding metaphysics based on conceptual analysis tested against intuition and 2) the conviction that scientific findings and methodologies can effectively address certain metaphysical challenges. The combination of these two positions generates pressure for the stronger view that metaphysical knowledge is only attainable through scientific results and methods, as it remains unclear what other avenue metaphysics could pursue if not conceptual analysis or scientifically influenced metaphysics."

To illustrate this, let’s consider a classical metaphysical dilemma: the question of personhood. Philosophers have suggested various criteria for defining what constitutes a person. For instance, personhood might stem from the continuity of memory and mental states; in other words, I am the same person I was five or ten years ago because I retain memories from that period, and my psychological identity is consistent with that of my past selves. Alternatively, personhood may be defined by physical continuity: while I do not consist of the exact same molecules I had five or ten years ago, new molecules gradually replaced the old ones without interruption. There are several other potential conceptualizations of personhood as well.

Analytic philosophers often engage in lively debates on such topics. If you're a fan of Star Trek, you might ponder the following question: when Kirk steps into a transporter, is he killed and a duplicate created at the other end, or is he genuinely transported to the planet? Our intuitions on this matter differ. Chalmers seems to believe that Kirk survives each transporter use, while I do not. Is there empirical evidence that could resolve our conflicting intuitions? I doubt it, which implies that this issue is not relevant for scientific metaphysics. However, according to Kincaid, the only acceptable form of analytic metaphysics engages in conceptual analysis. Thus, when we explore diverse notions of personhood, we are not investigating some mind-independent reality; rather, we are clarifying what individuals (from a particular time and culture) might mean by "person." Chalmers would likely take issue with this characterization of analytic metaphysics, but I fully endorse it: in my view, the only viable philosophy is one that either draws from (and occasionally feeds back into) science or one that conducts logical analysis of human concepts and their implications.

Kincaid bolsters the case for a naturalistic philosophy by briefly discussing two additional examples. The first, derived from philosopher of biology Elliott Sober, addresses the role of simplicity (Occam's razor) in phylogenetic analyses, which reconstruct evolutionary relationships among species. Simplicity in phylogenetics is often presented as an instance of independently derived philosophical principles applied to science. However, Sober highlighted that the concept of simplicity, or parsimony as it is known in phylogenetic science, is actually grounded in empirical observation: we have seen that evolution seldom repeats itself. This observation led to the formalization of a principle of parsimony in phylogenetics, which could have developed differently had the world functioned in an alternate manner.

The second example comes from Kincaid's own research, in collaboration with Timothy Day. In a paper published in 1994, they argued that one of the most prevalent reasoning methods, known as inference to the best explanation (IBE), is not merely a priori logical inference, but relies on empirical assumptions that have been sufficiently validated over time to establish IBE as a useful tool in everyday and scientific reasoning. IBE, incidentally, is what Sherlock Holmes employs in Arthur Conan Doyle's stories, despite his frequent reference to his method as "deduction."

A particularly intriguing aspect of the ongoing debate between analytical and scientific metaphysicians is that it is far from new. Kincaid notes that Kant, often regarded as the father of modern philosophy, was deeply concerned with the connection between metaphysics and science, ultimately concluding that any metaphysics that detaches itself from scientific inquiry would lead to absurdities or, at the very least, engage in schmess-like reasoning—similar to Chalmers's philosophical zombies.

Next time: What are the prospects for a naturalized metaphysics?

This video, titled "Naturalism, Agency and the Metaphysics of Science," features Alison Fernandes discussing the implications of naturalism for metaphysical inquiry and agency within scientific contexts.

In "Aristotle's Metaphysics: The Physics Part 1," the exploration of Aristotle's foundational ideas reveals how they intersect with modern scientific thought and metaphysical questions.